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THE THIRTIETH CLEVELAND-
MARSHALL FUND LECTURE
ASBESTOS: THE PRIVATE MANAGEMENT OF A PUBLIC
PROBLEM*
HARRY H. WELLINGTON**
n October 1982, I was selected as the neutral moderator of a group con-
sisting of major asbestos producers, large insurance companies, and
prominent personal injury lawyers who are suing the asbestos producers,
and indirectly their insurers, alleging that thousands of their clients con-
tracted serious diseases by inhaling asbestos fibers. The aim of this tri-
partite group (which, for reasons that have little to do with my contribu-
tion, became known as the Wellington Group) has been to design a
private administrative agency that will fairly and effectively manage the
bulk of asbestos claims and asbestos product liability litigation.
Under the existing judicial system in America, asbestos litigation has
reached epidemic proportions. It is extravagantly expensive and grotes-
quely inefficient. Conceivably billions of dollars are at stake in this group
effort and the fair treatment of thousands of very sick people and
thousands more who one day will be ill as a result of asbestos may turn
on the success of this private initiative.
I. THE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE ASBESTOS PROBLEM
A. The Product and the Diseases
Asbestos is a mineral compound of great utility. It is strong and flexi-
ble, as well as fire and heat resistant. It is used in all types of construc-
tions. It is mixed with cement, tile, and paint. It is found in brake linings
and is wrapped around heating pipes to keep water warm. It is used for
siding, roofs, and ceiling insulation.
Yet if you work with asbestos, or come in contact with it in one way or
another, you easily could get some fibers into your lungs. If that happens
often enough, it is very dangerous indeed. For it is well documented that
* This paper was delivered, in a slightly different form, as the Thirtieth Cleveland-
Marshall Fund Lecture. While I have added a few footnotes, I have not attempted to
convert that lecture into something it was not meant to be: a full-blown and documented
research paper on the legal aspects of the asbestos problem.
** Dean and Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.
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asbestos causes two types of deadly cancer-mesothelioma and
bronchogenic carcinoma-as well as asbestosis, a serious lung disease that
renders breathing difficult, and is sometimes lethal.'
All of these diseases have long latency periods; it takes 15 to 40 years
after exposure to asbestos for an illness to manifest itself. This is impor-
tant for various reasons; as we shall see, it makes litigation complex and it
suggests that the problem will remain well into the twenty-first century.
Recent epidemiological studies disagree. Collectively, however, they fore-
cast that over the next thirty years, asbestos will account for approxi-
mately 74,000 to 265,000 deaths.2
B. The Nature of the Underlying Tort Litigation
Individuals or entities who believe they have been harmed by asbestos
often sue the corporations that produced the asbestos and the products
that incorporated or used the substance in some way. Often it is impossi-
ble to know with particularity who is responsible. How can a plaintiff
identify the manufacturer of products used years ago? In such situations,
a plaintiff will sue all relevant asbestos producers (the average number of
defendants is roughly twenty)' with the goal of holding them jointly and
severally liable. This strategy has worked.
Some suits seek property damages: removing asbestos insulation from
schools is a principal example. The bulk of the cases, including those I am
most concerned with, are those involving bodily injury; the alleged injury
is either asbestosis or cancer, and the action is typically a strict products
liability suit, sounding in tort. In addition to exposure, injury, and prod-
uct identification, the burden is on plaintiff to demonstrate that the de-
fendants knew, or should have known, that asbestos exposure created a
health-risk, and that this in turn created an unmet obligation to warn the
plaintiff.
The leading case sustaining this cause of action was decided in 1973.,
Today it is estimated that there are more than 24,000 asbestos product
liability claims pending in American courts.' There is every reason to be-
lieve that this number will continue to increase and remain high over the
next thirty years unless some alternative to the present system is
adopted.
C. Compensation, Expenses and Projection
A study, recently completed by the Rand Corporation, reports that
A standard medical work is I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE (1978).
J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION 3
(Rand Institute of Civil Justice, 1983)(hereinafter cited as RAND REPORT).
Id.
Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prod., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
RAND REPORT at 3.
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from "the early 1970s through the end of 1982, approximately 400 million
dollars has been paid by defendants and their insurers in total compensa-
tion for asbestos-related injury."6 Eighty-four percent of this occurred af-
ter January 1980. This figure includes settlements and trial awards in
personal injury products liability actions. It "excludes all defense legal
expenses and related costs." Moreover, it tells us nothing about how
much of this 400 million dollars received by plaintiffs was transferred to
plaintiffs' lawyers for legal expenses and related costs.
Another study completed in 1983 estimates that within the next thirty
years this 400 million dollar figure will grow from anywhere between 7.6
and 87.1 billion dollars.8
The Rand study also reports that the "average total compensation per
claim paid by all defendants and their insurers was approximately
$60,000 and total defense litigation expenses were $35,000 (fifty percent
of total compensation)." If we apply the Rand figure for defense to esti-
mates of total compensation over the next thirty years, we find that,
under the existing system, defense costs will be in the billions.
Compensation and defense figures of this magnitude are part of the
justification proffered by Manville, the largest asbestos producer, and two
other companies for seeking reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act. Manville's approach to the asbestos litigation problem
has caused considerable disruption among all participants in the industry,
as well as insurers and plaintiffs. Indeed, Manville's bankruptcy may well
have been one of the reasons for the establishment of the group I have
been moderating.
D. Some Explanation of Defense Costs
The ratio of defense costs to compensation awards in asbestos litigation
is substantially higher than in most other tort cases.'0 One reason may be
the importance and extensive use of discovery in preparation for trial. It
may be important for the parties to know who knew what fifteen to forty
years ago. The principal reason, however, appears to be the number of
defendants named in each suit. As mentioned earlier, due to the long la-
tency period of asbestos-related diseases, it is generally impossible to
know with particularity who is responsible. A plaintiff, accordingly, will
sue all relevant asbestos producers intending to hold each jointly and sev-
erally liable. Often each defendant (and its several insurers, or both) has
its own defense team.
RAND REPORT at 17. (Italics in original).
Id.
P. MAcAvoY, J. KARE & P. WILSON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ASBESTos RE-
LATED DISEASE 4-45 (unpublished, 1983).
RAND REPORT at viii.
,o Id. at 26-27.
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This duplication, with its resulting multiplicity of lawyers, is expensive
and wasteful. Many efforts-some more successful than others-to
achieve coordinated defenses have been attempted." But under the ex-
isting system there is bound to be profound conflicts of interest and more
than a little lack of trust among the defendants, their insurance carriers,
and between the two groups. A truly coordinated defense requires a prior,
and perhaps general agreement on defendant's liability. Only by such
agreements can there be responsible allocations of liability among pro-
ducers, or harmony between defendants and their insurers. Among other
things, the group I moderate is in quest of this goal.
E. Contingency Fees
Even as the relationship between compensation and defense costs is
alarmingly high in asbestos litigation, so too is the ratio of recovery to the
fees paid lawyers representing plaintiffs. Generally, lawyers handle cases
on a contingency fee basis. While this may help to explain high fees, it
means that the meritorious-or at least victorious-plaintiffs subsidize
those who lose. At any rate, the Rand study found that of the total com-
pensation paid to plaintiffs from early 1970s to the end of 1982, "[forty-
one] percent was used by plaintiffs for litigation expenses. '"12
The Rand study concludes that due to the exorbitant costs of asbestos
litigation, each dollar to injured plaintiffs is paid for at a cost of two dol-
lars and seventy-one cents to defendants." This is simply unacceptable.
For if this trend were to continue it is virtually certain there will not be
enough defense money to compensate for the victims of asbestos diseases,
nor enough insurance to maintain the survival of many asbestos defen-
dants. These defendants are large corporations that provide employment
to workers in communities all over the United States and the loss of these
corporations would have negative ramifications throughout the American
economy.
I hope this background will help explain the purpose and dynamics of
the Wellington group.
II. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION: C.P.R. AND THE WELLINGTON GROUP
In the early fall of 1982, shortly after the Manville corporation sought
reorganization, I was selected to moderate a tripartite effort aimed at re-
ducing transaction costs and promoting the fair settlement of asbestos
related claims. The group that selected me, with the help of the Center
" Procedural reforms for asbestos litigation have also been recommended. See e.g., FINAL
REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION WORKING GROUPS ON ASBESTOS
LITIGATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (1984)).
" RAND REPORT at 38.
Id e. at 38-39.
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for Public Resources (a private non-profit organization dedicated to the
reduction of conflict and the promotion of alternative and less expensive
methods of dispute resolution) consisted of insurers, producer, and plain-
tiffs' attorneys. Along with my Yale colleague, Edward Dauer, and James
Henry, the president of C.P.R., the parties involved spent several days
over several weeks getting to know each other in order to establish that
minimum of trust necessary to work together on the problem. My ap-
proach was to ask each group of participants to educate the moderator or
facilitator, as I was generally called, about the asbestos litigation indus-
try, each from its own perspective.
There can be no question that initially it was necessary to get the group
talking. Apart from the plaintiff's lawyers (whose internal disagreement
seemed to have more to do with personal conflicts than with substantive
issues), communication was vital for holding the producers and insurers
together as separate groups. For in the Fall of 1982, there were numerous
conflicts and disagreements within each industry as well as between
them.
A. Conflict Among the Producers
In the first place, the producers that were the defendants in the under-
lying tort litigation, were sharply split between the three of them, includ-
ing Manville, that sought reorganization in bankruptcy as the solution to
their asbestos liability while the rest were committed to alternative meth-
ods of resolving their difficulties.
Second, all the producers had a stake, and potentially conflicting posi-
tions, on the method of calculating their liability share. For that share
would determine the percentage of every settlement each producer or its
insurer would pay.
Third, each producer's attitudes and priorities were influenced impor-
tantly by the amount of insurance it had purchased over the years and
the amount of coverage that insurance afforded. Insurance money availa-
ble for indemnification and defense varied substantially among produc-
ers. If a company had sufficient coverage in the short run-particularly if
it had the assurance of a judgment in its favor and against its insur-
ers-but had no insurance ten years down the line, its approach to a solu-
tion and its priorities were bound to differ from the producer who had
fair coverage now and for the foreseeable future.
Finally-and this is really a different sort of point-the producers had
nothing in common except asbestos litigation. They were not in an indus-
try whose members had a history of cooperation.
B. Conflicts Among the Insurers
Two factors were principally responsible for the different perspectives
and lack of cohesiveness among the insurers. The first is the structure of
the industry. Under the standard policy, the primary carrier (which
1984-85]
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writes the initial coverage) not only has a duty to indemnify its policy-
holder, but also to provide defense. Yet, such defense does not deplete
liability limits. Excess carriers-and some primaries write excess insur-
ance-provide coverage above the primary layer. Normally, excess poli-
cies either do not have a defense obligation or, if they do, defense costs
reduce indemnity limits. Finally, there are reinsurers who have no con-
tractual relations with policyholders. Their contracts or treaties are with
primary or excess insurance companies that lay-off through reinsurance
the risk they have assumed.
Clearly, the interests of the various types of insurers differ. For exam-
ple, due to high defense costs in asbestos litigation, some primary insurers
may have an interest in exhausting their indemnity limits quickly where
the defense obligation is tied to indemnity. This is not in the interest of
the excess carrier, for it means that the excess carrier must start paying
sooner. Moreover, if the excess carrier has no defense obligation, it is
bound to be less concerned about litigation costs than the primary
carrier.
The second factor that caused conflict in the insurance industry was
the differing positions that the various companies took regarding when an
insurance policy had to respond in order to indemnify an asbestos defen-
dant. Was it at the time that the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos; was it
many years later when the illness manifested itself or some other time?
There were substantial disagreements and hard feelings within the indus-
try over these questions.
But the insurance industry is an industry whose members do business
together and have a continuing relationship with each other. The compa-
nies are bound together by a host of problems other than asbestos. This, I
believe, proved to be very important to our group and the success it has
been able to achieve. Nevertheless, one might have hoped for more coop-
eration from the insurance industry.
C. Conflicts Between Producers and Insurers
The insurance coverage questions, along with some other insurance
questions, badly separated the insurers from the producers. Disagreement
led to major litigation, charges of bad faith, and claims for punitive dam-
ages. The insurers and the producers did not trust each other. Each saw
the other as an enemy.
Because these insurance questions did not directly involve the plain-
tiffs' lawyers, it became clear to all in the group I was moderating that
the producers and the insurers would have to meet without the plaintiffs
to try and work out their profound disagreements about insurance cover-
age. Until the single question of "who pays for what?" could be answered,
there could be no true solution to the underlying tort litigation, neither
could an independent, fully-funded Asbestos Claims Facility be created
as an alternative expensive litigation.
[Vol. 33:375
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As might be suspected, the answer reached to this question, after
months of bargaining, was heavily influenced by the judicial decisions ap-
plying insurance policies, decisions rendered before and during delibera-
tions. I shall try to give a brief overview of some of this evolving back-
ground law.
D. The Insurance Coverage Cases
In a formal or doctrinal sense much of the background involves the
interpretation of comprehensive general liability policies issued by carri-
ers to asbestos producers. Typically, these policies, written in the late
1960s and early 1970s, provided that the insurance "company will pay on
behalf of the insured . . . damages because of bodily injury. . . to which
this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence." Bodily injury was de-
fined to mean: "bodily injury, sickness, or disease," and occurrence was
defined as "an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which
results, during the policy period, in bodily injury.' 1 4 Such language would
not present serious problems of interpretation if exposure to asbestos and
manifestation of an asbestos-related disease both took place within the
same policy year; the definitions of occurrence and bodily injury would be
satisfied. But exposure may be 15 to 40 years prior to manifestation, al-
though the disease may have begun at the time of exposure. The develop-
ment of asbestos-related diseases is just not clear. As one court has said:
"[I1t is not known how little exposure is required to cause disease [and]
inhalation may occur over a long period of time. As a result, inhalation
may continue through numerous policy periods, the disease may develop
during subsequent policy periods, and manifestation may occur in yet an-
other policy period." 5 Accordingly, it is surely linguistically possible,
given the policy's definitions, to say that exposure either is or is not an
"occurrence" and that the beginning of the disease, absent any functional
impairment, either does or does not constitute a "bodily injury."
The insurance companies disagreed among themselves as to the mean-
ing of this policy language and they did so in the most public of ways-in
coverage litigation with policyholders. Some insurers insisted that cover-
age was triggered only when an asbestos-related disease manifested itself.
This position means that all policies issued during the latency period pro-
vide no coverage. Other insurers insisted that coverage was triggered only
by exposure, that is, by the inhalation of asbestos fibers. This approach
means that all policies issued subsequent to exposure provide no cover-
age. It is therefore significant to recall that it may be many years after
exposure ends before a disease manifests itself.
Given the public disagreement among insurance companies on the
" See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.; 667 F.2d 1034, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
" Id. at 1040.
1984-85]
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meaning of their policies, one need not have been clairvoyant to have pre-
dicted the future: some courts adopted manifestations as the trigger of
coverage,'8 some exposure;" and some divided exposure into inhalation
exposure (breathing asbestos fibers) and exposure in residence (the pe-
riod fibers are in the lungs before the disease becomes manifest). The
latter courts made either type of exposure a trigger of coverage and added
manifestation itself as an additional trigger. This is the so-called triple-
trigger approach. 18
All the courts looked at identical insurance policy language. All under-
took to rest their decisions on the interpretation of that language. But
there can be little doubt that each court was powerfully influenced by
what all courts took to be a general proposition of insurance law: "resolve
doubts," in this case, doubts highlighted by the inconsistent theories of
insurance lawyers, "in favor of maximizing coverage."' 9 The manifesta-
tion courts, and the exposure courts, came out differently because the
application of this general proposition to particular facts dictated differ-
ent results. The triple trigger courts were merely more imaginative in giv-
ing the general approach its fullest application.
The principal triple-trigger case is Keene v. INA, 0 decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. That
case held that once coverage is triggered, an insurer is liable in full, but
"that only one policy's limits can apply to each injury,"'" and that the
insured "may select the policy under which it is to be indemnified."" The
court stated: "In any suit against [a defendant] for an asbestos -related
disease, it is likely that the coverage of more than one insurer will be
triggered. Because each insurer is fully liable, and because [a defendant]
cannot collect more than it owes in damages, the issue of dividing insur-
ance obligation arises. The only logical resolution of this issue is for [a
defendant] to be able to collect from any insurer whose coverage is trig-
gered, the full amount of indemnity that it is due, subject only to the
provisions in the policies that govern the allocation of liability when more
than one policy covers an injury.""
" See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass.
1981), aff'd in part, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1280 (1983).
" See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980), clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
18 Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
" Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 1222 (6th Cir. 1980),
clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
20 See supra note 18.
Id. at 1049.
22 Id. at 1049-50.
Id. at 1050.
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E. The Implications of the Coverage Cases to the Wellington Group
The direction that coverage litigation seemed to be taking and the ra-
tionale that shaped the judicial decisions, significantly influenced negoti-
ations in our group. It seemed quite clear to me that the producers could
not accept a universal coverage resolution unless it gave them a generous
interpretation-perhaps one as generous as Keene-to the insurance law
proposition that one resolves doubts in favor of maximizing coverage.
Moreover, the fact that insurance companies did business with each other
on a continuing basis, and thus were better situated than the producers to
make internal accommodations on a variety of other issues, led me to be-
lieve that such an agreement might be achieved.
Of course, something had to be given in exchange. The quid pro quo
turned out to be an agreement by the producers to dismiss their actions
against the insurers, actions that often alleged bad faith and claimed ex-
tensive punitive damages. A conditional coverage agreement was reached
after months of extremely difficult negotiations. It recognized that some-
time after Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod.24 , the 1973 product liability
decision, insurance policies were protectively written, often with high de-
ductibles, in order to limit insurers' asbestos liability. The carriers agreed
that the producers could, if they wished, exhaust their earlier coverage
before using this less desirable insurance. Under the agreement, each pro-
ducer could unilaterally draw a line sometime between 1973 and 1979.
That line would then define a coverage block that could be enlarged for,
over time, more protectively written policies may be added by the
producer.
Briefly, a claim triggers all insurance policies within the block from the
time of first exposure to the time of diagnosis or death, whichever occurs
first. Each policy that is triggered will respond to a claim in a pro-rata
fashion and, when primary insurance for a particular year is exhausted,
excess insurance for that year will drop down for indemnity purposes.
Moreover, when coverage in any year is exhausted, insurance from other
years within the block will, in most cases, fill the gap. But the total limits
of each insurance policy, of course, will not thereby be increased. While
this approach is quite different from Keene, it seems clear that for most
producers it is as favorable an outcome.
The coverage agreement was conditioned on the resolution of many
other problems. This has now been accomplished in one way or another.
A few issues need mention in order to convey a sense of the complicated
nature of the matters before the group.
" Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prod., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974).
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F. Some Additional Insurance Problems
(A) One problem, similar to the coverage issues I have discussed, is
the trigger of liability in property damage cases. Many schools in the
United States have insulation made of asbestos which is beginning to
flake. School boards are having the asbestos removed to ensure the health
of children. It is expensive to remove asbestos and to cover the cost, the
school boards are suing producers on a theory of product liability. The
producers want indemnification and defense from their insurers, and
there is disagreement as to when a policy is triggered for these purposes.
Needless to say, the producers are pressing for the property damage ana-
logue of Keene, while the insurers wish to limit the trigger of coverage.
To date, there is little background law and our group has not been able to
reach an agreement. Everyone therefore agreed to establish and fund an
asbestos claims facility for bodily injury cases before attempting further
to resolve the property damage coverage question.
(B) Almost as significant as indemnity coverage in personal injury cases
is the duty to defend. As I have mentioned, primary insurers have an
obligation to defend their policyholders as well as to indemnify them. No
one doubts that the defense obligation exists as long as indemnity limits
have not been exhausted. Producers claim, however, with some strong ju-
dicial support," that insurance policies written on forms developed before
October 1966 provide a defense obligation that survives the exhaustion of
inde nnity limits. Vast sums of money may turn on this contention. Pri-
mary coverage for some producers is virtually exhausted already, and ex-
cess layers of insurance either do not provide defense or do so only by
depleting indemnity limits.
Of course, if our Asbestos Claims Facility works, that is, if it is capable
of settling claims fairly inexpensively, and with less litigation, defense
costs will be sharply reduced and the legal questions will be less impor-
tant. But neither the producers nor the insurers were prepared to assume
unilaterally that risk over this question. Accordingly, for several months,
while the parties struggled to find a compromise, prospects for a success-
ful conclusion of our entire undertaking seemed bleak. It was indeed a
grim period.
Finally the elusive compromise took shape: the producers recognized
that the defense obligation ended when indemnity was exhausted. But it
was agreed that the facility to be established would itself provide a sup-
plementary defense program for pre-1966 policies. Since, under the reso-
lution of the coverage issue the facility would be paid for almost entirely
11 AC and S, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 576 F. Supp. 936, 942 (E.D. Pa.), ap-
peals docketed, Nos. 83-1927, 1928 (3d Cir. 1983); Commercial Union Insur. Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Corning Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Zurich Insur. Co. v. Raymark
Indus. Inc., No. 78L8760 at 6 (Il1. Cir. Ct. Cooks Cty, June 15, 1982). Contra, Keene Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 78-1011 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1984).
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by the insurers, the facility's defense program would have to be financed
by premiums paid by insurance companies. In a sense, therefore, the com-
promise was an insurance type of solution to a difficult insurance
problem.
(C) Throughout the discussions in our group, and in many separate
meetings with participants from insurance companies, I was told of a
sharp distinction that had to be drawn: one between insurance policies
written before the industry understood the asbestos problem and those
written thereafter. The latter, I was told, were written defensively and
took account of asbestos product liability case law. The insurers took the
position that policies should be interpreted with this distinction clearly in
mind. I should add, however, that this point was not made with respect to
coverage triggers, presumably because the language relevant to that issue
had not been changed.
While the producers were much less clear about this distinction, they
did not resist it too strongly. No one was confident about the appropriate
date for the distinction. As we have seen, the producers were allowed uni-
laterally to set the date with respect to establishing an initial coverage
block. With respect to other matters, however, it was finally decided that
each producer and its insurers would reach their own agreements on
which policies were pre-date and which were post-date.
Much turns on this distinction between pre- and post-date policies with
respect to, for example, how the parties will handle deductibles that are
not limited explicitly by insurance policy language. To greatly simplify,
pre-date policies with low deductibles are to be capped at agreed-upon
multipliers; post-date policies are to apply as written. The same general
approach is to be used for insurance policies written without aggregate
limits.
Much more could be said about the insurance issues that engaged the
attention of the insurers and producers in our group. But, I believe that I
have said enough to convey a sense of the complexity of the problems we
faced. And remember that the amount of money at stake in our negotia-
tions is in the billions of dollars. Tough problems and high stakes gener-
ally lead to hard bargaining: It certainly did for us.
III. THE PROCESS OF DESIGNING AND THE DESIGN OF AN ASBESTOS
CLAIMS FACILITY
I now want to talk a little more about the bargaining as a process.
Then, I would like to look at the structure or design of the private admin-
istrative agency that the group hopes to have in operation sometime in
1985.
A. The Process
In my description of the insurance problems, I talked some about pro-
cess. I emphasized the nature of the insurance industry and of the pro-
1984-851
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ducers' group, and related this to the negotiations. I also stressed the cen-
tral function played by law and the development of trust that evolved
through discussion. Let me now pick up on this latter point.
Perhaps the most significant contribution that I, and the other neutrals
who worked with me, made to the success of our group was to keep the
process going. Over and over again the parties reached an impasse. They
reached it in ways that would have made it extremely difficult for them
to get back together if there had not been a third party present, someone
who could explain, help save face, and especially, take the blame. More-
over, as moderator I was able to reduce tension and avoid impasse by
changing the subject or terminating a session. The odd story, joke, or
quote-sometimes made up-was a good tool in the early days when the
parties saw each other as enemies.
In those early days little substantive progress was made; there was too
much friction. Yet, the time was well spent, for it was necessary for the
parties to let off steam and for all of us to feel our way toward an ap-
proach that would help the parties learn to trust each other and, indeed,
the neutrals. Progress depended on everyone's belief in the others' good
faith. Each participant had to prove that he wanted the enterprise to suc-
ceed, that he was willing to give up something important to make it suc-
ceed, and that he was not using our group merely as a way of advancing
his own or his company's special interest.
One approach that helped a great deal involved reducing the size of the
negotiating teams. Each team reported to its parent group and took in-
struction. Over time, however, power and responsibility became vested in
the negotiating teams. Through the exercise of that power with responsi-
bility, a shift occurred: the parties began to trust each other and substan-
tive progress took place. I believe that my team and I helped establish
this essential precondition to success.
We were, as well, able to make some substantive suggestions that
proved helpful. Generally, this took place in talks with one side or the
other. Often, however, our ideas were rejected. I think we were probably
most influential with the insurers on the substantive issue of insurance
coverage. We were able, in a disinterested fashion, to evaluate the judicial
decisions, and to make it clear that given the evolving law the producers
would not move-indeed they really could not move-to any arrangement
that was less favorable for them than Keene.
In the first eight months or so of our group process, the insurers were
more open with me and my associates than were the producers. I attri-
bute this to the fact that the insurers frequently did business together
and trusted each other enough to talk in front of us. It took longer for the
producers to reach this point because they had had less experience deal-
ing with each other and did not trust each other enough to be candid with
us, or to let us participate in their interal group debates. When this
changed, we began to make more and faster progress. I am not sure, how-
ever, whether there is a causal relationship, and if there is, how the causa-
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tion runs.
I should mention another important factor in our success: that is the
failure or at least the lack of success of other efforts. There were several.
Our ability to keep the talks going, even when we were making no pro-
gress, gave us considerable credibility. Moreover, because most of our
meetings excluded plaintiffs' lawyers, my associate and I played a role in
keeping them informed and interested. The plaintiffs' commitment to our
effort added importantly to its credibility and gave it an external valida-
tion that helped keep us going.
Time will not permit me to explore this area further. It is an article
itself. There is much to be said about how pending litigation, including
the Manville reorganization proceedings, influenced the course of our pro-
gress; how concern with other toxic torts affected attitudes toward asbes-
tos insurance problems; how important confidentiality has been and why;
what role various personalities played in the process; how power struggles
within companies influenced progress; how carrier and producer insur-
ance lawyers, trained in a particular type of drafting, addressed the con-
stitutional-type problem faced by our group; and much, much more.
But after all is said that can be said about process, it probably in the
end is the case that our group reached agreement because the alternative,
the present formal justice system, is too costly and was seen by almost
everyone as no more than a second best way of dealing with the asbestos
problem.
Well, then, in what stage of this continuing drama do we now find the
Group, and what does its design for the asbestos litigation industry look
like?
B. The Design
We now have a final agreement. The details of that agreement are pub-
lic, and educational sessions have been held to persuade the insurance
companies and the asbestos producers that have not been members of our
group to accept our work and formally subscribe to our plan.
Our plan calls for the establishment of an independent nonprofit or-
ganization to be known as the Asbestos Claims Facility. The Facility will
administer and arrange for the evaluation, settlement, or defense of all
asbestos-related claims against its members. Its members will be insurers
and producers who subscribe to the agreement that was so desperately
negotiated for some twenty months. That agreement, of course, includes
the resolution of such matters as the insurance coverage issues and the
duty to defend. These are matters that establish the method of funding
the new Facility. The evaluation, settlement, or defense of claims will be
paid for by the insurance, provided there is any, that each subscribing
producer, with its subscribing insurers, bring to the Facility. Assuming
that insurance has been purchased, how much is brought to the Facility
at the time of subscription depends on the coverage and other aspects of
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the agreement that the parties to our group have negotiated.
How the cost to the Facility of processing and finally closing a claim is
allocated to subscribers is an important matter that I have not yet dis-
cussed. Very briefly, the producers in our group, with the help of a con-
sultant, over a sixteen month period, developed a formula based on data
relating to their past litigation experience. The formula allocates a liabil-
ity share to every subscribing producer for all claims brought to the Facil-
ity. This means that when a claim is settled, a percentage of the cost of
the settlement will automatically be charged to each subscriber.
The complicated nature of the problems addressed in our group made
it clear to all that disagreements among subscribers might occur over the
meaning of the agreement or its application in particular situations. Ac-
cordingly, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedures have been
designed to resolve potential disagreements.
Moreover, during the months of discussion it became apparent that
some issues could not be resolved, and that the best we could do was to
fashion a procedure for a subsequent resolution. An example is the exclu-
sion from coverage of "asbestosis" written into some general liability poli-
cies. Given the understandings when those policies were written, should
the exclusion apply only to the disease we call asbestosis, or should it
apply to all asbestos-related disease? Over one half billion dollars could
turn on the answer to that question.
Often, but not always, questions of this sort were special problems for
particular members of the group. The procedures adopted for their ulti-
mate resolution took two forms: either good faith negotiation, followed if
necessary by binding private settlement through some form of ADR, such
as arbitration; or, negotiation, then non-binding ADR, followed, if re-
quired by formal litigation. Litigation, as a last resort, was believed neces-
sary in some cases involving hundreds of millions of dollars, in order to
satisfy either corporate shareholders or reinsurers. An example is large
deductibles without limits (over $25,000) in old or pre-date policies.28
When the Facility is established later this year, it is anticipated that
the lawyers of individuals, allegedly injured by asbestos, will bring their
cases to the offices of the Facility for investigation and settlement. Pro-
posed settlements that are not acceptable will go through an Alternative
Dispute Resolution procedure that is being developed in consultation
with the plaintiffs' lawyers. It is everyone's hope that ADR will be the
final step in all but a handful of cases which will go on to litigation in the
civil courts. The Facility will defend where such litigation is pressed, us-
ing one team of lawyers, not twenty or more.
At every stage, from claims handling, through ADR to litigation, there
should be savings; some very substantial. No one, of course, has any real
28 See Owens - Ill., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. 82-0089 (D.D.C. Nov. 21,
1984).
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way of knowing how substantial. But remember where we presently are:
for every dollar a plaintiff keeps, it cost insurers and producers $2.71.27 I
will be disappointed if, through the Facility, this figure is not reduced
substantially so that in the long run the Facility saves hundreds of mil-
lions, perhaps billions, of otherwise wasted dollars.
Members of the legal profession have an obligation to see that this
comes to pass. I believe that members of the insurance and asbestos in-
dustries do too. Each has public obligations to reduce waste and put
money in the hands of victims. I believe that the Facility responds mag-
nificently to these obligations.
Moreover, decision-makers in these two industries as well as myself
have special obligations. These obligations attach to us because we, or
others whose shoes we fill, have failed in the past.
As the dean of a great law school, I am bound to accept responsibility
for the training of lawyers. We have trained the best and the brightest to
think about winning lawsuits. On the coverage question some of those
best and brightest were lawyers for insurance companies: some argued ex-
posure, while others argued manifestation. Both won in the sense that
major insurance companies committeed themselves to either a manifesta-
tion or an exposure theory. This split cost almost every company in the
insurance industry millions of dollars.
Where were the insurance executives? How could they have risked the
war to win a battle?
Where are they today with respect to the Asbestos Claims Facility?
The fact is that while the prospects are very promising, we may not yet
have the critical mass of insurers necessary to start the Facility. I believe
that one reason for this is that some insurance executives are letting their
lawyers tell them that they have a better way. The lawyers may be right,
even as they were right on the coverage question, but only in that way.
I predict that if our private facility fails because too few insurers (or
producers) subscribe, an external solution ultimately will be imposed by
the courts or some other branch of government. A governmental solution
could rock all the players in the asbestos litigation industry.
Mr. Michael J. Horowitz, Counsel to the Director and General Counsel
of the Office of Management and Budget, who is the Chairman of the
Administration's Toxic Torts/Compensation Group, and who has given
his strong endorsement, along with Secretary Baldrige, to our private ap-
proach, also warned about government involvement. In a personal-letter,
he said it "would almost certainly lead to compensation programs that
would not only be far more costly than the existing system of compensa-
tion through tort litigation, but would also require heavy if not bankrupt-
ing producer and insurer assessments." I hope this will not occur; I hope
and believe that the Facility will be established. If it is, I know it will
11 RAND REPORT 38-40.
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work.
Moreover, and more generally, I hope that lawyers and their clients,
who are so influential in the shaping of private policy with vast public
implications, can together raise their sights, can together start thinking
less about victory in battle and more about long run solutions. Indeed-if
you'll allow me some metaphorical latitude and promise not to tell the
New Yorker magazine-I hope that lawyers and their clients can stop
making decisions that are so heavily influenced by the knowledge that
bad consequences willcome home to roost on someone else's watch.
I suspect that this type of consciousness raising - a concern with long
run (or, at least, middle distance) solutions rather than quick victories -
may just be the mission for legal education in the next decade. I hope so.
In my judgment, such a shift in perspective is long overdue. Even at the
Yale Law School, it is time for change.
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